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The paper questions common assumptions in the dominant representational framings of information systems
success and failure and proposes a performative perspective that conceives IS success and failure as relational
effects performed by sociomaterial practices of IS project actor-networks of developers, managers, tech-
nologies, project documents, methodologies, and other actors.  Drawing from a controversial case of a highly
innovative information system in an insurance company—considered a success and failure at the same time—
the paper reveals the inherent indeterminacy of IS success and failure and describes the mechanisms by which
success and failure become performed and thus determined by sociomaterial practices.  This is explained by
exposing ontological politics in the reconfiguration and decomposition of the IS project actor-network and the
emergence of different agencies of assessment that performed both different IS realities and competing IS
assessments.  The analysis shows that the IS project and the implemented system as objects of assessment are
not given and fixed, but are performed by the agencies of assessment together with the assessment outcomes
of success and failure.  The paper demonstrates that by reframing IS success and failure, the performative
perspective provides some novel and surprising insights that have a potential to change conversations on IS
assessments in both the IS literature and IS practice.
1
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Introduction
The failure rate of information systems (IS) development and
implementation projects has not changed much in the last 30+
years, remaining worryingly high at around 70 percent,
depending on the source (Doherty et al. 2011).  The disap-
pointing failure rates of IS projects and the uncertainty of
value realization through systems use are still troubling prac-
titioners and puzzling researchers (Bloch et al. 2012; Doherty
et al. 2011; Remus and Wiener 2010; Urbach et al. 2008).  A
substantial body of IS literature has proposed and tested a list
of both technological and organizational factors that should
assist organizations in successfully completing the projects
and delivering the expected benefits (El Emam and Koru
2008; Petter et al. 2008; Sabherwal et al. 2006).  However,
given the persistence of such high failure rates, it appears that
substantial accumulated knowledge has not made a difference
in IS practice (Cobb 1996; Doherty et al. 2011). This
proposition, on the other hand, seems somewhat inconsistent
with the evidence from the recent survey by McKinsey &
Company (2011) that companies worldwide are increasing
their IS investments and also their expectations for infor-
mation systems  to support innovation and growth.
This inconsistency might be partly attributed to the dominant
framings of IS success and, by implication, failure that under-
pin our empirical studies.  It is generally assumed that an IS
project is considered successful if it delivers a working
system “on time, on budget and to specifications” (Doherty et
al. 2011, p. 2; see also Sauer and Davis 2010).   The success
of an IS project is assessed using these simple measures, per-
ceived as objective, rational, and fact-based:  projects do
indeed deliver either on time, on budget, and to specifications
or not.  Such assessment, however, ignores the unavoidable
uncertainty in determining and predicting the time required
and the budget needed for the development of a system
defined by its specifications (information requirements).
Furthermore, specifications are likely to change during the
development and even after the system is implemented
(Holmström and Sawyer 2011; Truex et al. 1999).  Another
prescription from the literature that a successful IS imple-
mentation “delivers benefits that exceed the costs of achieving
them” has also been questioned (Doherty et al. 2011, p. 2).
Benefits take time to realize.  Whether an information system
would be considered a success or not is contingent upon the
calculation of benefits, tangible and intangible, and the time
allowed for benefits to materialize.  What is remarkable in the
assessment of both IS projects and implemented systems is
the use of simple and seemingly objective measures to repre-
sent their success despite the uncertainty and arbitrariness
involved in such representations.
Other prominent approaches in the literature have assumed
that there is no objectively correct account of success/failure
and that the assessment outcomes (measures) do not exist
irrespective of the actors, stakeholders with differing views
and often conflicting interests.  Theoretically diverse research
opens up a wider field of inquiry by framing IS success as
subjective interpretations, narratives, and social constructions
resulting from often complex and contested social and
political processes, in specific organizational contexts (Bartis
and Mitev 2008; Briggs et al. 2003; Fincham 2002; Jones and
Hughes 2001; Sauer 1993; Smithson and Tsiavos 2004;
Walsham 1999; Wilson and Howcroft 2005).  For instance,
the interpretive flexibility of an information system explains
how different social groups attribute different meanings and
construct different narratives of an IS success or failure
(Bartis and Mitev 2008; Fincham 2002).  Importantly, dif-
ferent meanings, interpretations, narratives, and political
negotiations are also particular representations of IS success
by different social groups.  While we learned a great deal
about IS assessment processes, these studies tended to empha-
size the role and agency of social actors in determining
success and to downplay the role of the very objects of assess-
ment:  information systems and IS projects.
As this brief discussion suggests, the framings of IS success
in the literature are representational in nature.  In other
words, IS success is represented either by objective measures
or by subjective perceptions of social actors.  The problem
with representationalism, as science studies scholars have
long argued, is the assumption that representations and the
objects they represent are independently existing entities
(Barad 2003, 2007; Rouse 1996).  That is, assessments of IS
success as facts or perceptions exist as entities separate from
IS as objects of assessment.  What is particularly striking is
the faith in representations, either as measures or subjective
interpretations of IS success, as opposed to that which is
represented.  What seems to be hidden from view is that IS
projects and implemented systems as objects of assessment
are not given and fixed but are themselves performed as
objects by the processes of assessments.
The aim of this paper is to propose a performative perspective
on IS success as an alternative to representational modes of
framing, and to show how it advances knowledge and enables
novel insights into the phenomena of IS assessments.
Founded on a sociomaterial worldview (Barad 2003, 2007;
Orlikowski 2010), the performative perspective draws atten-
tion to sociomaterial practices in IS project actor-networks
defined as configurations of IS developers, managers, tech-
nologies, project documents, methodologies, and other actors.
It is IS project actor-networks within which project objec-
tives, time lines, and resources are negotiated and projects and
their assessments performed (Law and Callon 1997;
McMaster and Wastell 2005).  The performative perspective
reveals the ways in which these actor-networks give rise to
different agencies of assessment that perform different IS
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assessments, as well as information systems.  The perfor-
mative perspective provides a conceptual apparatus for
examining local reconfigurations of IS project actor-networks
involving shifting sociomaterial practices and production of
IS assessments, thus allowing us to examine a key question:
How do different and potentially competing assessments of an
information system and an IS project arise from different
sociomaterial practices?
We explore this question by drawing from the case study of
a project that delivered a highly innovative information
system in an insurance company, which was fraught with
controversy.  While the IS implementation was highly praised
and considered a success by the users (insurance brokers, who
as intermediaries sell these products to clients), both the
system and the project were considered a failure by key
managers of the organization.  By following the IS project
from its inception and by examining the production of com-
peting assessments from the performative perspective, we
show how an inherently indeterminate IS success becomes
locally determinable and thus seen as determinate in different
sociomaterial practices.  The paper demonstrates how the
performative framing extends the body of knowledge on IS
success and also opens a conceptual space for seeing how
existing framings are produced and taken for granted.
We develop our argument by first reviewing existing framings
of IS success and their underlying assumptions.  We then
introduce the performative perspective and its key assump-
tions based on a sociomaterial theoretical foundation.  This is
followed by a description of the research methodology, the
adoption of actor-network theory (ANT) and a brief story of
the case company and its IS development, implementation,
and assessment.  Based on the ANT study of the reconfigura-
tions of the IS project actor-network, the discussion focuses
on the ways the information system was enacted in different
sociomaterial practices and the mechanisms by which these
different enactments created multiple and competing realities
of IS success and failure.  The paper concludes by sum-
marizing the theoretical and potential practical contributions
of the performative perspective on IS success and some novel
research questions raised by it.
Literature Review and Theoretical
Background
Representational Framings of IS Success
Definitions of IS project and system success and failure in the
literature are in abundance (Doherty et al. 2011; Ewusi-
Mensah and Przasnyski 1994; Fincham 2002; Lee and Xia
2005; Lyytinen and Hirschheim 1987; Sauer 1993).  Widely
adopted and still relevant is Lyytinen and Hirschheim’s
(1987) classification of failures as (1) an IS correspondence
failure when a system does not meet the predefined set of
objectives (a system is either abandoned or scaled down),
(2) an IS process failure that denotes unsatisfactory develop-
ment performance that does not deliver a functioning system
or runs over time and over budget, (3) an IS interaction
failure defined as users’ dissatisfaction with or poor usage of
a system, and (4) an IS expectation failure indicating inability
of the information system to fulfill stakeholders’ needs,
expectations, and interests.  Such views of IS failure are
representational as they assume the existence of certain
properties or factors that determine failure.   IS success is
defined as a mirror image of IS failure.
The representational view of IS success is widespread in the
literature irrespective of the differences in research ap-
proaches and perspectives.  This can be seen by examining
the literature broadly clustered around the objective/rational
and the subjective/political perspectives, which were initially
defined by Hirschheim and Smithson (1988) and later adopted
by Introna and Whittaker (2003).  While founded on different
ontological and epistemological assumptions both perspec-
tives on IS success show their representational nature as
summarized in Table 1.
Underlying the objective/rational perspective is an ontological
assumption that an IS project success or failure exists as a
discrete and determinate state, and an epistemological
assumption that success and failure can be determined and
objectively measured.  It is further assumed that measures or
criteria for assessment are rational and neutral and thus
produce objective assessments, irrespective of the assessor
(Introna and Whittaker 2003).  Similarly, it is assumed that
success and failure of an information system implemented and
used exist out there, determined by the system’s properties or
factors such as information quality, system quality, and
service quality; satisfaction with the information system and
realization of expectations; and performance and functionality
according to specifications and predefined objectives
(Doherty et al. 2011).  In the assessment process, both infor-
mation systems and IS projects are considered passive and
neutral objects of assessment whose properties, performances,
and benefits are objectively represented and measured using
various criteria.
Such a representational view led researchers to examine
whether information systems and IS projects that succeeded
have certain characteristics that are significantly different
from those that failed.  Researchers, therefore, have surveyed
organizations to find out which characteristics or factors are
associated with success and which ones with failure.  It was
found, for instance, that numerous organizational and social
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Table 1.  Representational Nature of Different Framings of IS Success and Failure in the Literature





An IS project success/failure exists as discrete
and determinate states that can be objectively
measured and represented.
An IS project success is measured typically by
project completion on time and on budget and the
delivery of IS (an IT artefact) according to
specifications.
An IS project as an object of assessment is objec-
tively represented and assessed by rational and
neutral measures thus making the assessment
independent of the assessor.
Research has found a range of factors causally
linked to IS project success/failure:
• Senior management commitment and support
• Active user participation
• Business planning and project planning  
• Clear project goals and specifications of the IT
artefact
• Effective project management and control
• Culture, leadership and management issues
• Appropriate staff training
• Appropriate expertise and capability of IT/IS
professionals
An IS project success/failure does not exist out there
but results from processes of sensemaking and
interpretation, organizational discourses and political
negotiations within particular socio-cultural and
political contexts. 
An IS project success/failure is thus represented as
narratives, interpretations and discourses by different
stakeholders and social groups; as they typically
have different values, interests, interpretive schemes
and information needs they do not agree about IS
project assessments or what constitutes a success or
failure. 
Research contributed to understand how particular
interpretations and narratives of IS project success/
failure emerge within dynamic organizational, social
and political contexts.
The assessments of IS projects are found to be
changing as episodes of success and failure emerge
within unfolding projects; research also found that IS
project success often depends on stakeholders and
the timing of assessment and is thus seen as





An IS success/failure exists and is determined by
IS properties irrespective of the assessor.
As an object of assessment IS is assumed
passive and neutral.
 
Research has found that IS success/failure is
objectively represented using various measures:
• Information quality, system quality and service
quality
• Satisfaction with IS and realization of
expectations 
• IS performance and functionality according to
predefined system objectives and specifications
IS success or failure do not exist out there but are
created and negotiated through narratives, interpre-
tation, organizational discourses and political pro-
cesses as part of socio-technical and political
contexts.
Various research approaches have highlighted
• How IS success or failure emerges as the dominant
narrative, socially shaped and constructed by
powerful social groups
• How success or failure is attributed to an IS imple-
mented and used by different social groups or
stakeholders, often involving organizational change
and innovation, political struggles and negotiations,
and legitimation of a new organizational reality
factors, including senior management commitment and sup-
port, active user participation, and other factors, have been
causally related to IS project success (e.g., Biehl 2007; Currie
1997; Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski 1994; Fincham 2002;
Lee and Xia 2005; Wang et al. 2008).  Similarly, a range of
factors has been found that are related to IS success (DeLone
and McLean 1992, 2003; Dibbern et al. 2004; Doherty et al.
2011; Flowers 1996; Rai et al. 2002; Urbach et al. 2008;
Wang 2008) as indicated in Table 1.  The contribution of
objective/rational research is considered significant as the
identification of factors and properties that are critical to
achieving project and system success enables managers and
IS professionals to focus their attention on managing and
controlling a limited number of factors in notoriously complex
IS projects (Remus and Wiener 2010).
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The representational nature of the objective/rational framing
of IS projects and IS success has, however, a limited research
agenda and contribution.  Assessment criteria and represen-
tations of success imply that IS projects and implemented
systems are static, abstracting their dynamic nature and social
contexts.  For instance, the factors determining IS success do
not take into consideration that benefit realization takes time
and that assessments of a system at different points in time
would inevitably produce different outcomes (Doherty et al.
2011).  Furthermore, the lists of factors do not take into
account the variability of organizational, social, and political
contexts in which factors may variously affect an IS project
and system success (He and King 2008).
The subjective/political perspective, on the other hand, does
not assume that success or failure of IS projects exist out there
but rather proposes that they emerge and become perceived as
such by specific organizational, socio-cultural, and political
processes (Table 1) (see Bartis and Mitev 2008; Fincham
2002; Howcroft et al. 2004; Jones and Hughes 2001; Klecun
and Cornford 2005; MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985; Mitev
2000; Myers 1994; Smithson and Tsiavos 2004).  For
instance, an early process model proposed by Sauer (1993)
assumed no objective account of failure and focused on key
stakeholders such as the project organization responsible for
the development and maintenance of the information system
and the project supporter/promoter who provides resources for
the IS project.  Both the success and failure of an IS project
are seen as socially and politically motivated and created,
often by a coalition of stakeholders.
A distinctly interpretive and narrative approach to IS success
was proposed by Fincham (2002), who also rejected the
assumption that success or failure exist as definite states,
seeing them as narratives that emerge through sensemaking,
interpretation, and attribution of meaning by various
individuals, social groups, or stakeholders.  This perspective
emphasizes the subjective, interpretive ,and political nature of
assessments.  By examining two case studies of IS projects,
Fincham demonstrated how narratives change throughout the
course of projects, including both success and failure at
different times in each project.  In another example, Bartis
and Mitev (2008) demonstrated how the dominant narrative
of a more powerful social group prevailed and disguised an IS
failure as a success.  By drawing attention to different percep-
tions and interpretations of the information system by dif-
ferent (relevant) social groups, they revealed how the IS
success was socially and politically constructed.
Employing a range of theoretical foundations research within
the subjective/political perspective provided important contri-
butions to the understanding of various organizational and
political processes of IS assessments and the attribution of
success or failure.  However, the framings of IS success
within this perspective have been limited due to the repre-
sentational nature of the assessments.  Information systems
and IS projects, as objects of assessment, are represented by
subjective perceptions, interpretations, narratives, social
constructions, or discourses by different social groups or
stakeholders.  Each group chooses the assessment criteria and
interprets them to suit their interests, worldviews and
objectives.  Such representations of IS success downplay the
role of information systems and IS projects and take them as
passive objects of assessment processes.
While the two prominent perspectives on IS success—the
objective/rational and the subjective/political—differ signi-
ficantly, they both imply that assessments of information
systems and IS projects are particular representations of
reality.  In both perspectives, the assessment of informatoin
systems and IS projects is an “act of representation…
[through which] the world is reduced to a more manageable,
portable form” (Smithson and Tsiavos 2004, p. 213).  Impor-
tantly, these representations of information system and IS
project success are considered distinct and ontologically
separate from what is being assessed, that is, information
systems and IS projects.  This is rooted in the Cartesian
worldview that is deeply embedded within Western culture
(Barad 2003).2  The key issue with such representationalist
assumptions is that the practices and performances of
representing and their productive effects are disregarded
(Rouse 1996).  By dealing with assessments of information
systems as ontologically separate from information systems—
the objects that are being assessed—the messiness, indeter-
minacy, and arbitrariness of the assessment processes and
their performative effects are disregarded or hidden.  This has
profound implications for reporting IS success and failure in
industry surveys and the production of a particular picture of
IS failure rates.
Toward a Performative Framing of IS Success
The performative perspective on IS success is proposed here
as a nonrepresentational mode of theorizing.  The performa-
2Representationalism is defined in Encyclopaedia Britannica as “philo-
sophical theory of knowledge based on the assertion that the mind perceives
only mental images (representations) of material objects outside the mind, not
the objects themselves.  The validity of human knowledge is thus called into
question because of the need to show that such images accurately correspond
to the external objects”  (http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ topic/
498476/representationism).  Rouse (1996), and Barad (2003, 2007), among
others, examine the constraints of representationalist assumptions in
theorizing the nature of scientific practices.
MIS Quarterly Vol. 38 No. 2/June 2014 565
Cecez-Kecmanovic et al./Reframing Success & Failure of Information Systems
tive perspective changes the focus from questions of accurate
measurements or subjective/political assessments of IS suc-
cess to questions of sociomaterial practices and the ways in
which they produce realities and perform both IS and their
success or failure.  It is grounded in a sociomaterial world-
view that has been articulated by scholars in science studies
(Barad 2003, 2007), actor-network theory (ANT) and science
and technology studies (STS) (Latour 2005; Law 1988, 1992,
2004, 2008a, 2008b; Mol 1999, 2000, 2002), and more
recently proposed in organizational studies and Information
Systems (Orlikowski 2007, 2010; Orlikowski and Scott 2008;
Suchman 2007).  The sociomaterial worldview in both the
natural and social sciences questions the taken-for-granted
nature of entities, that is, essentialist assumptions that humans
and nonhumans, the social and the technological, have a set
of essential properties that make them what they are and
establish a priori the boundary between them.  Instead, what
humans and nonhumans are is seen as temporally constituted
by discursive-material practices (Barad 2003, 2007; Law
2004).  The performative perspective thus shifts the focus
from uncovering the essences of things to the processes of
their becoming:  how they come to be seen as particular things
and defined by certain properties and boundaries.
To appreciate the meaning of this particular non-essentialist
view, it is important to understand that the sociomaterial
worldview is underpinned by a relational ontology, which
means that humans, technologies, and other nonhumans do
not preexist as separate entities with given properties and
boundaries but are enacted and emerge through relations in
practice.  They are relational effects.  As Law explains, rela-
tional ontology 
treats entities and materialities as enacted and
relational effects.  Its relationality means that major
ontological categories (for instance, “technology”
and “society,” “human” and “non-human”) are
treated as effects or outcomes, rather than as ex-
planatory resources (2004, p. 157).
The performative perspective is thus concerned with relations
among actors—anything that acts or is acted upon, including
those we have a habit of calling the human, social, and cul-
tural, as well as the nonhuman, material, and technological—
without presuming their essential nature or properties.
Instead, by focusing on relations, the performative perspective
highlights their precarious nature:  actors are constituted
through relations as relational effects.  This further implies
that agency is not limited to humans.  As Orlikowski
reminded us, 
Latour (1987, 1992, 2005) has long argued that
agency is not an essence that inheres in humans, but
a capacity realized through the associations of actors
(whether human or nonhuman) and thus relational,
emergent, and shifting (2007, pp. 1437-1438).
These dynamic and open-ended associations of heterogeneous
actors—also called actor-networks or sociomaterial assemb-
lages by ANT scholars3 (Latour 2005; Law 2004)—are thus
seen as a primary focus of empirical studies4 seeking to
investigate the emergence of agency and the performative
production of actors and their boundaries as relational effects.
Actor-networks are dynamic configurations of actors engaged
in and performed by particular sociomaterial practices that
produce differences that matter, both the semantic (meanings)
and the ontic (what exists) (Barad 2007; Law 2004).  To
understand the dynamics of associations in actor-networks
and how differences are made and actors become performed,
Barad (2003, 2007) proposed the notion of intra-action.  In
contrast to interaction, which assumes a form of interchange
among independently existing actors (entities), the notion of
intra-action denotes emergence and reconfiguration of actor-
networks within which properties and boundaries of actors are
continually reconstituted.  Assuming the relational ontology,
individual actors are not taken as given and preexisting before
entering into relations; rather, they “emerge through and as
part of entangled intra-relating” (Barad 2007, p. ix) and exist
only in relations.  “Outside of particular agential intra-action,
‘words’ and ‘things’ are indeterminate” (Barad 2007, p. 150).
This is an important assumption that allows us to observe
relations without initially ascribing actors any essential nature
or properties.  In other words, we are free to observe anything
that acts or is acted upon, that is, actors, and their dynamic
intra-acting within emerging actor-networks and discover how
properties of actors and their mutual boundaries are enacted
in relations, and thus become determinate.  This implies what
Barad called agential cuts:5
3Latour (2005), Law (2004), and Suchman (2007) use the terms socio-
material assemblage and actor-network as synonyms; for simplicity, we will
use the latter.
4Law (2008a) argues that the empirical and the theoretical in ANT and
science and technology studies (STS) cannot be separated and that they are
developed together:  “Theory and data are created together [primarily through
case studies and are a] major mode of self-expression, discovery and
exegesis” (p. 629).
5Barad calls her particular ontological and epistemological framework agen-
tial realism.  Agential realism is concerned with understanding entanglements
between and developing a performative account of the human and the non-
human, the social and the technological, the discursive and the material and
how they intra-act and coproduce each other in practice.  Agential realism,
Barad emphasizes, “is not about representations of an independent reality but
about the real consequences, interventions, creative possibilities, and respon-
sibilities of intra-acting within and as part of the world” (2007, p. 37).  It is
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It is through specific intra-actions that the bound-
aries and properties of the “components” of phe-
nomena become determinate and that particular em-
bodied concepts become meaningful.  A specific
intra-action…enacts an agential cut…effecting a
separation between “subject” and “object.”  That is,
the agential cut enacts a local resolution within the
phenomenon of the inherent ontological indeter-
minancy (2003, p. 815).
As illustrated by several ANT studies, actors’ properties and
boundaries are typically in flux and become temporarily
stabilized through specific intra-acting (in Barad’s termin-
ology) and thus come to be seen as specific objects and
subjects, given and real (Callon 1986; Law and Callon 1997;
Mol 2000; Orlikowski and Scott 2008).  Instead of taking
these temporally stabilized objects and subjects as given and
real, the performative perspective focuses our attention on
intra-acting in actor-networks and on particular sociomaterial
practices of agential cuts that perform these specific objects
and subjects with particular properties and boundaries.
Building on the above assumptions, the performative perspec-
tive on IS assessment is concerned with the emergence and
reconfiguration of IS project actor-networks and the ways in
which particular assessments are intra-actively produced and
stabilized.  Information systems are developed, take their
form, and acquire their attributes as a result of ongoing intra-
actions and agential cuts within project actor-networks.  The
performative framing draws attention to the enactment of an
information system in sociomaterial practices emerging
through specific intra-actions among actors that come to be
seen as developers, technologies, methodologies, tools, users,
managers, contracts, business processes, plans, documents,
etc.6  Information systems emerge, are produced, implemented
and used through relations among the actors in project actor-
networks.  Consequently, information systems as well as IS
assessments have no independent existence outside of these
relations and actor-networks.
This further suggests that, to understand IS assessments, we
have to explore IS enactments located and situated in practice
and focus on the dynamics of relations among numerous
actors and the emergence and reconfiguration of actor-
networks leading to agential cuts by which the realities of suc-
cess or failure are performed.  This brings us to an important
proposition that IS enactments in different sociomaterial
practices can in principle produce different realities, including
different IS assessments.  The point here is not that there are
various views of a single true reality of an IS success but that
there are multiple realities of IS assessment produced by prac-
tices in different actor-networks.  As Law explained, “the
world is not simply epistemologically complex.  It is onto-
logically multiple too” (2008a, pp. 636-637).
To explore how different IS enactments can produce different
realities including different assessments, we draw from the
concept of ontological politics:7
If realities are enacted, then reality is not in principle
fixed or singular, and truth is no longer the only
ground for accepting or rejecting a representation.
The implication is that there are various possible
reasons, including the political, for enacting one
kind of reality rather than another, and that these
grounds can in some measure be debated.  This is
ontological politics (Law 2004, p. 162).
In the world of IS practices, we are talking about situated
enactments and various reasons why an IS project and an
information system enacted in a particular location, that is, a
sociomaterial practice in an actor-network, create one kind of
reality rather than another.  The question of IS assessment and
the production of multiple realities of IS success or failure can
thus be debated in terms of doing different ontological
politics.
The performative perspective provides conceptual apparatus
for an alternative framing of IS success that is sensitive to the
emergence of project actor-networks, ontological politics, and
situated sociomaterial practices of IS projects within which
and by which information systems are enacted and success or
failure performed.  It also provides concepts to explore how
particular local configurations and agential cuts in different
actor-networks temporally stabilize and thus enact specific
and potentially competing IS realities, including a success or
failure.  Generally, the performative perspective enables us to
pose and explore an interesting research question:  How do
about making and remaking realities and how they matter.
6In ANT terminology, these are actors or actants enrolled and continually
performed in heterogeneous actor-networks (Callon 1986, 1991; Latour
2005).  In this paper, we use the generic term actor to denote anything that
acts or is acted upon.
7Mol was first to define ontological politics:
Ontological politics is a composite term.  It talks of ontology—
which in standard philosophical parlance defines what belongs to
the real, the conditions of possibility we live with.  If the term
“ontology” is defined with that of politics, then this suggests that
the conditions of possibility are not given.  That reality does not
precede the mundane practices in which we interact with it, but is
rather shaped within these practices (1999, pp. 74-75).
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different and potentially competing assessments of infor-
mation systems and IS projects arise from different socio-
material practices?  We explore this question and ground the
performative perspective on IS success by investigating the
case study.  We now present the research methodology,




We conducted the case study in an Australian insurance
company that deals primarily in general insurance, life risk,
and investments.  The company, called here Olympia, is a
medium size firm with 1200+ employees, a part of a large
multinational insurance group operating in over 170 countries.
In 2001, Olympia undertook to become the first insurance
provider in Australia of web-based e-business services to their
brokers.  Without much experience, Olympia embarked on the
development of a web-based information system, called
Olympia-online, to enable selling their business insurance
products online.  Four years in the making, in 2005, Olympia-
online emerged as a sophisticated information system, eagerly
adopted and highly praised by the broker community.
Olympia-online’s success in the broker community created an
evident competitive advantage for the company:  a sharp
increase in their earnings and profit margins.  However,
Olympia’s Steering Committee, including two top business
managers, was dissatisfied with some of Olympia-online’s
functional deficiencies, its rising costs, and its unsatisfactory
cost-effectiveness.  Two years after the second successful
implementation and despite the huge success in the market
(more brokers selling Olympia insurance products and gener-
ating business for Olympia), the Committee declared
Olympia-online a failure and withdrew its support for funding
its future development.
Olympia-online was an industry-first e-commerce system in
the Australian insurance market that transacted the company’s
insurance products directly to brokers over the web.  The final
Olympia-online system was highly innovative in the way it
presented the company’s insurance products and enabled
online engagement and interaction with brokers as they sold
these products to clients.  However, the withdrawal of support
by the Steering Committee for further Olympia-online devel-
opment created a worrying situation for the company.
Olympia-online was vital to the company since all of its busi-
ness was mediated through brokers and, unlike other insur-
ance companies, it had no direct contact with individual
clients in the general insurance domain.  As its only channel
for transacting business with brokers, Olympia-online was
seen throughout the company as being of strategic impor-
tance.  That Olympia-online was considered simultaneously
a success and a failure, with both assessments supported by
evidence, was indeed puzzling.  The Olympia-online project
thus presented an exemplary case8 through which to examine
our research question.
The ANT Study
Contact with Olympia was established during the second half
of 2004 when one of the authors, a part-time research student
at the time, worked as a member of the Olympia-online
implementation and testing team.  Intrigued by the Olympia-
online project, this author put forward a proposal to conduct
a research study on the development and implementation of
Olympia-online.  Before the end of her contract with Olympia
in December 2004, she received permission (including
university ethics committee approval) to conduct research in
the company.  She then spent six months (February–August
2005) in the company, this time as a full-time researcher
conducting an ANT field study.  The two other authors were
engaged as outside observers (Walsham 1995) and super-
visors.  Visits to the company continued in the second half of
2005 and during 2006.
The ANT study started with the researcher (author) in the
field and two other authors involved in the study design, data
analysis and interpretation.  The researcher in the field was
engaged in observations, discussions, and interviewing while
continually presenting and discussing the experiences and the
data collected with the two other authors.  In this way, we
interpreted the data and questioned the findings during the
fieldwork, which then directed further data collection.  Our
ANT study continued beyond the fieldwork—piecing together
a trajectory of the Olympia-online project actor-networks—
until November 2006.  Hence, the ANT study effectively took
place during the period February 2005–November 2006 with
the three authors working closely and with a varying level of
involvement in the field.9
8We borrow here from Kuhn (1962) and in particular Law (2008a) who
argued that we learn from “exemplary historical moments and episodes” (p. 
629) and that the “abstraction is only possible by working through the
concrete” (p. 630).  Empirical case studies are thus seen as important in STS
“because they articulate and re-work theory” (p. 630).
9It is worth noting that the first 6 months of working on the Olympia-online
testing and implementation, which  preceded the ANT study, were highly
useful for acquiring knowledge of the insurance industry, the Olympia
company and its market situation, interaction with brokers, and, in particular,
Olympia-online’s architecture and application software, its implementation,
and maintenance issues.  Knowing the people and the Olympia-online project
was very helpful for the research student to get access and collect data.
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A word about our choice of ANT is in order here.  We chose
ANT as a distinctly sociomaterial methodology (Alcapidani
and Hassard 2010; Law 2004, 2008b) that provides analytical
tools for a sociomaterial analysis.  ANT fosters, as Law
(2008b) explained, “a sensibility to the messy practices of
relationality and materiality of the world” (p. 142).  To adopt
ANT, however, does not mean to apply a singular method-
ology or a set of prescriptions to conduct an empirical study
(Latour 2005; Law 2008a, 2008b; Ramiller and Wagner
2009).  ANT, together with its methodological principles and
tools, needs to be translated into a particular research practice,
which in turn changes ANT as a methodology as well as
changing us, the researchers—an interesting topic but beyond
the scope of this paper.  To describe how we adopted ANT to
conduct a sociomaterial analysis of the Olympia-online case,
we present briefly (1) the mode of investigation, (2) the means
of inquiry, and (3) the practices of reassembling the story and
producing knowledge claims.
The mode of investigation involved tracking and tracing the
unfolding relations since the beginning of the Olympia-online
project to discover how actors seen as humans, technologies,
documents, and others created space, time, and a network of
relations to construct and carry forward the Olympia-online
project.  We started with relations among the actors involved
in the testing and implementation of Olympia-online and from
there expanded to relations with other actors and locations.
This was a messy process in which we discovered relations
that had created particular documents (the business case,
scope document, contracts, licence, test plans, minutes),10
technologies (mainframe computer, rule-based software
engine, application software) and specific roles and identities
of project managers, architects, business analysts, application
developers, testing team, brokers, and others (see the Appen-
dix).  We also learned from them how they created actor-
networks.  For instance, we traced the initial relations among
managers and developers around a business case document,
which grew into an Olympia-online project actor-network that
created a space where the project objectives, scope, and time
lines were negotiated and resources allocated.
In this process, we were assisted by the Information Services
Department, which provided an organizational chart with the
official roles of human actors and reporting relationships
presented in Figure 1.  These actors are also listed in Appen-
dix Table A1 together with their pseudonyms, roles, and
tasks.11  This helped us to track down the actors in charge of
certain actions who could “give us a story” (Ramiller and
Wagner 2009, p. 48) and describe events and actions that we
could not experience ourselves.  The researcher in the field
had at least some informal discussions with all the actors on
the scene during the period February–August 2005 (22 actors
from the chart on Figure 1 and two brokers involved in
testing) and also formally interviewed 13 of them.12  Further-
more, to understand how technologies and documents were
created as actors in the actor-network (listed in Appendix
Tables A2 and A3)13 and how they acted and were acted upon,
we investigated traces that they had left and the effects per-
formed (Bruni 2005).  For instance, we followed the mobili-
zation of a rule-based software engine into the IS develop-
ment actor-network and observed how it initially became a
key platform for building an innovative system.  It later
emerged into an actor that required significant additional
work to be useful, slowing down the development.  We also
traced how this software acted as a delegate for the company
that was contracted to assist in the development.
Like any study of practice, our study grew bigger, more
complex, and difficult to manage as we delved into various
paths that the tracing of relations took us.  Therefore, we had
to limit our study to the assembling and reconfiguration of the
Olympia-online project actor-network and its ultimate
decomposition into two emerging actor-networks within
which the project and its outcome (Olympia-online) were
performed and assessed.14
An issue with our study was that we arrived at the scene after
the project was well under way.  Tracing the relations was,
therefore, not limited to the present and often moved to the
past.  In interviews and informal discussions, the human
actors habitually referred to what had happened before, how
other actors behaved, what decisions were made and how
10Most documents were confidential, could be read only at the company
premises, and could not be cited without special permission.
11We note here that the “pre-given” roles (resulting from earlier intra-actions)
were important for our understanding of their actions and responsibilities but
they did change together with their identities as the study progressed.  At any
point in time, an actor acquired a particular identity and acted depending on
relations (past and present) with other actors.
12Interviews were taped and transcribed and notes from informal discussions
typed.
13It is important to note that Figure 1 and the Appendix reflect a typical
distinction between humans and nonhumans, including some taken-for-
granted properties made in practice.  This, however, should be understood as
resulting from the prior intra-actions among the various actors and agential
cuts that produced people in their particular roles, documents with certain
meanings, and technologies with specific characteristics.  While documenting
these, we do not see them outside relations with other actors.  As we followed
some actors we saw how their relations changed and how their properties and
boundaries transformed.
14We were able to focus our study on the Olympia-online project as it was
rather disconnected from other projects, such as the development of the inter-
face with the e-commerce platform Horizon carried out by a third party.
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Figure 1.  Olympia Organization Chart and Positions Involved in the Olympia-online Project (Actors
interviewed are dark grey; those involved in informal discussions are light grey.)
these preceding events conditioned or influenced the current
situation.  In ANT parlance, the actors were not able to
explain present relations and actor-networks without tracing
their emergence historically.15  In this respect, we faced chal-
lenges as our ANT study tended to extend in many
unexpected directions.  However, we learned to re-scale and
refocus our study in space and time as we progressed,
confirming Ramiller and Wagner’s observation that ANT
enables an “adaptable view on the scope of what should, in
the actual fieldwork, be followed up on, tracked and traced”
(2009, p. 45).
The means of our inquiry—observations, interviews, infor-
mal discussions, reading of documents—had a lot in common
with ethnography.  The researcher was not located outside but
was a part of the world being studied.  However, our approach
to human actors in the field differed from an ethnography:  we
did not engage with them as “informants” but rather as pro-
ducers of their own realities and theories.  We learned from
them how they constructed their associations and “what the
collective existence has become in their hands, which
methods they have elaborated to make it fit together, which
accounts could best define the new associations” that they
established (Latour 2005, p. 12).  It is important to clarify that
actors’ accounts can be seen as both subjective and objective,
as can anything else they did or performed.  Their accounts
disclosed their engagements with other actors (both human
and nonhuman) and the effects of these engagements in a
particular way.  At the same time, actors’ accounts testified to
reality-making practices of which they were a part and
through which they themselves and the world around them
15Such historical tracing of actors’ relations and their network building was
also assisted by project documents (listed in Appendix Table A2).  Our
approach to historical tracing of actors and their relations was inspired by
Law and Callon’s (1997) examination of an aircraft project in the United
Kingdom.
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continually changed.  In actors’ accounts there arose, there-
fore, a specific “subjectivity” of human beings and a specific
“objectivity” of a reality-making practice (Verbeek 2005). 
Finally, we provide a few words on our practices of reas-
sembling the story and producing knowledge.  During the
fieldwork, we continuously interpreted and questioned the
material at hand in an attempt to reconstruct the enfolding
relations, actor-networks, and their effects.  This included
discussions about and the construction of alternative explana-
tions.  Importantly, such processes were not separate from the
fieldwork as they continually fed back and impacted on the
fieldwork.  This indicated that our practices of knowing and
reassembling the story were intertwined with our engagement
with actors in the field (observing, interviewing, and dis-
cussing).  Hence, achieving objectivity was not about pro-
ducing “undistorted representations” of a preexisting reality
at a distance; rather achieving objectivity was about con-
structing knowledge “accountable to the specific materiali-
zations [in the IS project] of which we [were] a part” (Barad
2007, p. 91).
This was the most difficult aspect of our study:  being ac-
countable to the enfolding sociomaterial practices since the
start of the project.  This was difficult because (1) our
engagement was limited to the actors available during our
presence in the field, (2) tracing of relations was limited by
actors’ recollections and our access to relevant documents,
and (3) the reconstruction and piecing together of fragmented
stories and documented traces were inevitably a translation
and thus simplification and betrayal.  Furthermore, there was
a tension between the tendency to produce detailed accounts
of practice and the request to protect company interests.16  The
story of Olympia-online that eventually emerged resulted
from its testing, negotiation, and adaptation in the field but
was also rewritten to be comprehensible to the reader.
To tell the story and keep track of the emergence of actor-
networks, and to analyze their dynamics and trajectories, we
presented actor-network maps at different points in time along
the project time line inspired by Sarker et al. (2006).  Despite
inevitable simplifications, these maps were helpful for indi-
cating and discussing the actors’ enrollments and associations,
that is, relations in actor-networks, and also for keeping track
and discussing emerging reconfigurations.  The maps have a
meaning only as part of an ANT story and should not be
interpreted as literal networks.17  The actor-network maps are
also a good reminder not to confuse the ANT method and the
maps with the territory:  the method and the maps helped us
to deal with infinitely complex, uncertain, and unlimited
territory.
Through the ANT study described here, we addressed our
research question and exposed different enactments of the
Olympia-online project in practice and the ways in which they
produced different realities, including competing assessments
of both the project and the system.  But before embarking on
our ANT analysis, we briefly present the story of the
Olympia-online development.
The Olympia-online Story
According to the General Insurance (GI) managers, Olympia
was not seen as a major competitor in the Australian general
insurance market prior to the development of its Olympia-
online system.  All e-business in the Australian insurance
industry was conducted via BrokerLine, an outdated
mainframe-based electronic platform, run by Telcom, an
Australian telecommunications company.  More so than for
any of its competitors, this platform was vital to Olympia
since all its business was electronically mediated through
brokers, and Olympia had no direct contact with individual
clients in the general insurance domain.  Early in 2001,
Telcom announced to the industry that they were shutting
down BrokerLine, offering instead a new web-based e-
commerce platform, Horizon.  Unlike Olympia, most insur-
ance companies transacted their business both directly with
individual businesses and via the brokers.  This is why the GI
Business Division was particularly concerned that they might
lose all of their business.  But they also recognized the oppor-
tunities to use Horizon to innovate selling their insurance
products and their relationships with brokers.  Together with
the Strategy and Planning Division, they went about putting
a business case for the development of a new web-based
information system, Olympia-online, to enable innovative
transacting with brokers via Horizon.  The Information
Services Department was charged with developing Olympia-
online as described in the business case documentation.  As
it would be the only channel through which Olympia would
interact with brokers in the future after the closure of
BrokerLine, the development of Olympia-online was strate-
gically important.
16The agreement with the company was explicit in terms of the protection of
information about the project.  The description of the project, and especially
technical details about the Olympia-online system, had to be approved for
publication.
17Apart from presenting an abstract and simplified picture, graphical
representations have a drawback of being static and not allowing presentation
of dynamics and fluidity of networks.  This point is discussed by Latour
(2005, pp. 132-133).
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Olympia-online was a new type of IS in the insurance
industry.  The Information Services Department had neither
the experience nor the necessary skills and resources to
develop the system in-house.  Olympia, therefore, commis-
sioned several companies to develop prototypes using dif-
ferent technologies.  Only one company, HighTech, demon-
strated a viable prototype using Emperor, a proprietary rule-
based engine of which they were the sole reseller in Australia. 
A fixed-price contract with HighTech, signed in July 2001,
marked the beginning of Phase 1 of the Olympia-online devel-
opment.  Phase 1 was contracted for three months, until the
end of September 2001, but actually ended in mid-2002;
Figure 2 presents major events and the time line of the
Olympia-online project.
Phase 1:  Olympia-online Development
The HighTech team moved to the Olympia premises in July
2001 and together with the Olympia team from the Infor-
mation Services Department started the development.  Once
development was under way, several problems emerged.  The
Olympia team realized that the HighTech developers had no
knowledge of the insurance industry and had not grasped the
breadth and depth of the Olympia-online development.  In
retrospect, the head architect, George, from Olympia who had
been involved in commissioning the HighTech company,
admitted that the HighTech team “didn’t understand the
problem at hand, and underestimated its complexity, costs,
and the required time to develop the system.”
The key design issue in developing Olympia-online was the
use of the rule-based engine, Emperor.  George recalled how
the HighTech project manager convinced him before the
contract was signed that Emperor was the appropriate soft-
ware for modelling insurance products.  The HighTech project
manager, however, never fully disclosed Emperor’s capa-
bilities and limitations.  Working together with the HighTech
team, the Olympia team gradually realized that Emperor “was
not the right engine for the [Olympia-online] purpose.”  When
used to model insurance products and their complex business
rules, Emperor exhibited severe limitations and rigidity.18  For
instance, for a type of insurance policy (business or vehicle
insurance), several important elements figured in the calcu-
lation of a premium:  the amount and conditions of coverage
(specifying inclusions, exclusions, and limitations), details
about potential types of risk, and the assessments of risks.
The developers could not find an elegant way of programming
the rules of individual insurance products and calculations of
premiums in Emperor and thus had to add specific routines
and other processes on the mainframe, outside of Emperor.
The design of the Olympia-online application software
became cumbersome and time consuming.  During the inter-
view, Alan, the HighTech systems analyst, confessed
[Emperor] isn’t the most mature product, it’s not an
[insurance] industry standard product, and I’m not
sure it’s the best fit for what we’re trying to do here.
I know it’s not the best fit for what we’re trying to
do here.  It was oversold, if you want the honest
truth.  I know because I know the guys that were
selling it.
There were also problems integrating the software compo-
nents built on Emperor with those on the mainframe.  George
reflected on the difficulties involved:
[The HighTech project manager] probably had the
most experience—I mean the rest of us had zero
experience with Emperor.  He probably had the most
experience but not enough to make [efficient]
critical decisions….Every time you would suggest
“let’s not do this in Emperor, let’s do it outside [on
the mainframe] and let’s do it like this, there’d be
four more reasons on, “no but, if you don’t do it like
this then this will break in Emperor,” or something
like that….which we later found was not exactly
correct….So, the point is we were highly dependent
on them [the HighTech team.  We should have taken
the] decision to move a lot of this functionality,
which logically should never have lived in Emperor,
and which logic at that point said “don’t do it.”
Sunil, a HighTech architect, further explained how, as Phase
1 advanced, the relationship between the HighTech team and
the Olympia team became more contentious, primarily due to
design issues related to Emperor and the mainframe system.
He also noted that the more the application software relied on
Emperor “the more Olympia depended on the [HighTech]
company.”
The HighTech project manager and the Olympia head archi-
tect had trouble ensuring the delivery of the system on time
and with the specified functionality.  At the beginning of
2002, as Phase 1 Olympia-online was significantly delayed,
the head of the General Insurance (GI) Business Division,
Roger, publicly announced to the brokers that the new system
would be available with full functionality by mid-2002.  This
upset the Information Services staff, as George noted:
18Emperor was never intended to model insurance products; it contained
generic hierarchical structures with simple rules attached to the nodes and
was previously used for specifications of manufacturing products and their
structure.
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Figure 2.  Olympia-online Development and Implementation Time Limit 
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[We] had a huge blow out at that point between the
developers, myself, the head of General Insurance,
…[they] shouldn’t have gone out and promised that
because there’s no way in hell we can do it.  We just
had hundreds of defects outstanding, large parts of
functionality not working….At the end of the day,
they convinced us, everybody put in a huge amount
of effort and we sort of got it working with one or
two brokers, full functionality, ah, I think some-
where in July [2002].
When finally delivered to the brokers, despite a nine-month
delay, Olympia-online attracted and delighted the brokers:  it
was the first web-based information system in the insurance
industry.  The web-based interface and interactive tailoring of
insurance products transformed brokers’ selling practices. 
Brokers were able to focus more on clients’ needs and
tailoring the products to meet those needs.  During Phase 1
implementation (mid-2002 to mid-2003, see Figure 2),
Olympia attracted new brokers and boosted GI business:
Olympia-online itself was a huge catalyst for
[Olympia performance] in 2002, about packaged
business because Olympia wasn’t really seen as a
serious package underwriter in the market.  We’re
now seen as one of the leading package underwriters 
(Rene, senior GI Business manager).
Olympia-online’s success was confirmed by the increase in
the GI insurance revenue, which doubled in one year.
The GI business managers believed that Emperor was the key
contributor to success.  They were not aware of the problems
experienced during the development nor did they realize
Olympia-online’s technical deficiencies and instability in
operations.  To ensure future development, GI business
managers, on the advice of HighTech, made the decision to
purchase AUS $1 million worth of Emperor software licences.
Information Services staff were not consulted and their
objections to the decision were dismissed.
In the meantime, the Information Services staff were busy
struggling to maintain an unstable system and responding to
numerous defects.  When the Olympia-online system became
so unstable that its maintenance and use could no longer be
sustained, they proposed Phase 2 of the Olympia-online
development, which started in mid-2003 (see Figure 2).
Phase 2 Olympia-online Development
The document describing the Phase 2 development project
explicitly stated two major goals:  (1) to further develop
specified functionality for both brokers and internal users,
including GI managers, and (2) to deliver the new system on
time and on budget.  Consequently, the Phase 2 project was
developed under a stringent project management regime.  For
this purpose, a Steering Committee was created consisting of
stakeholders from the GI Business Division, the Strategy and
Planning Division, and the Information Services Department. 
The Steering Committee was financially responsible for the
project and thus primarily concerned with time frames and
costs.  Two new roles in Phase 2—the business project
manager (Stuart) and the IS project manager (Sebastian)—
were directly responsible for the system’s delivery on time
and on budget.  Phase 2, as the application developer Patrick
commented, “focused disproportionately on short-term issues
and cost considerations, at the expense of long-term quality
and functionality.”  Chris, the business expert liaising with the
brokers, had a similar observation:  “[In Phase 2] there was
always more of a consideration on the expenditure, the time
frames that [Olympia-online] development was actually
taking, rather than delivering the business needs.”  The tight
budget control and the focus on deadlines increased tensions
between the Steering Committee and the development team.
In Phase 2, Olympia-online development continued to
experience problems with Emperor and with inadequate
resourcing, as requests for additional resources were rejected
by the Steering Committee.  As a result, the Olympia team
could not develop full functionality and decided to prioritize
the desired functionality for the brokers.  Furthermore, the
two business experts (liaising with brokers and underwriting)
pushed for high quality that, according to Chris, prolonged
Olympia-online development “until a sufficient level of
functionality and quality required by brokers had been
delivered such that the new system would present as superior
to both the existing [Phase 1] system and other web-based
products developed by competitors in the meantime.”  This
prolonged delivery caused tensions with the IS project
manager who, according to Ron, the application developer,
“was constantly pushing for fast delivery.”  The Phase 2
development, despite all of the issues, eventually delivered
a pretty good quality product to market, whilst it
didn’t have everything we needed, or we wanted, or
that was originally scoped for the project, the
standard of quality of the product that we delivered
in the end was actually exceptional (Chris, business
expert liaising with brokers)
This ensured that when Phase 2 Olympia-online eventually
went live in mid-2005 it continued to delight the current
brokers and attract new ones as well.  This was acknowledged
by the head of GI, Roger:
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The positive side of the [Olympia-online] is that it
worked, it worked exceptionally well.  Brokers do
love it.  The [Olympia-online] product is excep-
tionally well received in the market and we continue
to get positive feedback that it’s in front of our
competitors.
However, he also emphasized the “negative side of Olympia-
online,” which was too costly, over budget, and not flexible
enough, and also “lacking internal reporting, which is very
disappointing.”  This view prevailed in the Steering Com-
mittee, despite the evident market success.  While they were
initially enthusiastic about the Olympia-online development,
the GI business managers did not engage with the Phase 2
development and were disappointed with the lack of internal
functionality and the system’s actual costs.  When Phase 2 did
not deliver the requested internal functionality and when it
became evident that the project was again over time and over
budget, the Steering Committee decided that Phase 2 of
Olympia-online was an “obvious failure.”
The GI Business Division, ultimately responsible for funding
future strategic initiatives, withdrew its support for further
expansion and building of Olympia-online.  The Steering
Committee did not approve plans for a Phase 3.  Other top
managers disagreed.  For instance, Olympia’s national e-
commerce manager, John, argued that
The problem we’re going to have is that it’s going to
be too late if we try to react to something that
happens in the next 6 to 12 months.  So if we want
to actually stay ahead [of the game], then we should
be doing something now; but at the moment, we’re
actually told there’s no budget for [the Olympia-
online development] to continue.
Not investing in the Olympia-online development and in
further technical improvements and not continuing with
further innovation, he added, might jeopardize Olympia’s
current market-leading position and expose the company to a
high risk of failure in the marketplace.  The future of Phase 3
development looked highly uncertain at the end of 2006 at the
time of our last visit to the company.19  In the following years,
Olympia-online Phase 2 continued to be marketed to the
brokers via the company website and, in 2010, an advanced
version was announced with extended coverage of insurance
products and new functionalities for the brokers.
Analysis and Discussion:  How
Olympia-online Became Both a
Success and a Failure
In this section, we reinterpret the story of Olympia-online by
conducting a sociomaterial analysis of the Olympia-online
project from its inception using ANT methodology.  We start
by first focusing on the creation of an actor-network around
the Olympia-online development, its dynamic reconfigura-
tions, and its ultimate decomposition, enabling us to follow
the trajectory of the Olympia-online project, the creation of
different sociomaterial practices and the production of com-
peting assessments of the Olympia-online project and the
system.
Emergence, Reconfiguration, and Decomposi-
tion of the Olympia-online Actor-Network and
the Enactment of Different Practices
The Olympia-online Phase 1 project started with the business
case that the GI Business Division and the Strategy and
Planning Division, referred to here as the GI top managers, in
collaboration with the Information Services Department, put
forward in order to align Olympia’s interests with the new e-
business platform, Horizon.  The actors—the GI top mana-
gers, the Information Services Department, Horizon and the
business case—thus created an initial actor-network with the
aim of developing the web-based Olympia-online system.
These actors then together enrolled HighTech, the company
that was to provide the rule-based engine, Emperor, and the
necessary expertise for the development of the web-based
system.  Olympia’s interests were thus inscribed in the Phase
1 business case document and the contract was signed with
HighTech specifying the required functionality and the
delivery deadline.  The Olympia team from the Information
Services Department together with the HighTech team were
charged with the development of the application software
using the mainframe resources and Emperor.  These events
and actions can be followed on the project time line in Figure
220 (listed as numbers 1, 2, …).  The emerging actor-network
of the Olympia-online Phase 1 project defined a space within
which the project objectives, scope, resources, and time lines
were negotiated.  The network is illustrated graphically in
Figure 3a using a simplified actor-network map inspired by
Sarker et al. (2006).
19Subsequent attempts to get permission to continue the study and collect
more data from Olympia were not successful.
20In our exploration of the emergence and reconfiguration of the Olympia-
online development actor-network we will remind the reader of key events
and actions listed in the project time line in Figure 2 in order to follow the
reconfiguration and ultimate decomposition of the network in Figure 3 as
well as the description of the Olympia-online project trajectory in Figure 4.
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a.  Olympia-online Phase 1 Development Network (mid-
2001 to mid-2002)
b.  Disintegration of the Olympia-online Phase 1 Network
(mid-2002 to mid-2003)
c.  Olympia-online Phase 2 and Steering Committee Networks (mid-2003 to end of 2006)
Figure 3.  Emergence and Reconfiguration of the Olympia-online Development and Implementation
Actor-Network
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As Phase 1 progressed, Olympia-online emerged as a key
actor comprising an actor-network of mainframe resources,
Emperor, the application software, the Olympia team, and the
HighTech team (Figure 3a).  The relations in this network
revolved around the development of the application software
for a selected class of GI products based on Emperor and the
mainframe platform.  The intra-actions within this network
included the Olympia team and the HighTech team investi-
gating and constructing the requirements together and then
experimenting with different designs of the application soft-
ware.  Their relations were contentious as the Olympia team
did not know much about Emperor, the HighTech team had
no knowledge of the insurance industry, and there were no
known types of information systems in industry from which
to learn.  
The intra-acting involved appropriation of Emperor to model
complex insurance products so brokers could tailor these
products to meet individual clients’ requests, specify and
assess risks, calculate a premium, and ultimately offer an
insurance policy.  Emperor was not appropriated as a general
rule-based engine but as a specific rule-based engine to model
various rules for risk specification and assessment, and for
calculation of premiums.  As the developers did not know
how to model these rules in Emperor they experimented with
alternative designs based on Emperor’s rule structures with
programmable extensions on the mainframe.  The key issue in
their appropriation of Emperor was an effective design of
innovative modeling of insurance products.  It was through
this intra-acting that the agency of Emperor emerged,
allowing some and resisting other design solutions.21  The
agency of Emperor cannot be taken as given; it emerged
through particular appropriations as part of alternative designs
of the application software.  As Phase 1 progressed, Emperor
became an actor that did not support efficient design.  The
intra-action between Emperor and the other actors in the
network enacted an agential cut, produced both materially and
discursively in design practice, which effected its local
separation and made Emperor an actor that betrayed the
Olympia-online actor-network.  Importantly, this transforma-
tion of Emperor’s identity and role remained confined to this
network.
Such intra-acting not only constructed Emperor as a particular
rule-based engine inadequate for insurance products, it also
(re)constructed the concept of the Olympia-online application
software, what it is and does, and the identities and roles of
the Olympia and the HighTech teams.  For instance, the
HighTech team, in the words of Marie the mainframe devel-
oper, were “concerned more with ensuring that [Emperor] was
used rather than finding the best solutions for the application
software” becoming “evidently driven by their company’s
interest.”  Their relations with the Olympia team, emerging as
key developers concerned with Olympia’s interests, became
increasingly contentious.  Such emergent intra-acting within
the Olympia-online actor-network was thus ontologically
reconstitutive:  it recreated the actors and their relations.
As a result, Phase 1 development engaged more resources and
took much longer than planned resulting in the delayed
delivery (event no. 4 in Figure 2).  During that time, the GI
top managers focused on extending the contract with
HighTech in order to ensure faster delivery of Olympia-
online.  This move gradually strengthened their relations with
the HighTech team while weakening the relations with the
Olympia team (event no. 5 in Figure 2).  The changing rela-
tions and transformations of actors, their roles, tasks, charac-
teristics, and capacity to act, prevented stabilization of the
Olympia-online Phase 1 project actor-network (Figure 3a). 
Starting with Olympia-online Phase 1 implementation mid-
2002, this network gradually decomposed, as illustrated in
Figures 3b and 3c.  The decomposition resulted from some
seemingly unrelated reconfiguration processes originating
within the Olympia-online Phase 1 project actor-network.  We
now describe selected episodes of these reconfiguration pro-
cesses in order to trace the trajectory of the Olympia-online
development and reveal their intended and unintended
consequences.  
After the GI top managers prematurely announced to the
brokers that Olympia-online would go live in mid-2002 (event
no. 6), the developers intensified the work and prioritized the
design of the system’s functionality for the brokers (event no.
7), thus postponing the delivery of internal functionality to
some time in the future.  The Olympia-online network
extended its relations to the e-business platform Horizon and
the business experts liaising with brokers and underwriting
who eventually enrolled the brokers in testing the application
software (Figure 3b).  As a result, the brokers’ interests were
successfully translated, putting further pressure on improving
the application software to meet their needs.  The intra-action
among the business experts, the development teams, Olympia-
online, and the brokers revolved around redesigning, fine-
tuning, and testing the application software and the web
interface for brokers.  The critical focus of this intra-action
was a sociomaterial entanglement of Olympia-online with the
brokers’ work practices in which a change in one triggered a
change in the other in an iterative way.  They were, to use
Pickering’s (1993) words, “mutually and emergently produc-
tive of one another” (p. 567).  The sociomaterial entanglement
21This does not mean that all potential ways for using Emperor to model
insurance products were tried.
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involved the testers from the Olympia team who payed
particular attention to detail observing the ways in which
brokers appropriated the Olympia-online system in their work
practice:  interacted with clients, specified insurance condi-
tions, defined and assessed different risks, customized
insurance products for them and ultimately executed trans-
actions online with the Olympia company.  Only through
hands-on engagement with brokers while they used Olympia-
online was it possible for developers and testers to mutually
grasp the depth of transformation and innovation of brokers’
practices and then change and fine-tune the software and the
interface of Olympia-online.  As Chris expressed it, “they did
an outstanding job…and actually contributed substantially to
[Olympia-online] being a quality product” highly praised by
the brokers.
When Olympia-online went live in July 2002 (event no. 8,
Figure 2), it enrolled a large number of brokers who adopted
it.  The brokers’ enactment of Olympia-online reconstructed
their work practices and their professional identities, signi-
ficantly transforming their interaction with clients and with
Olympia.  “It’s not only that [Olympia-online] is interactive
and that some fields are automatically populated…the whole
process is transformed,” explained a broker.  “We have more
time to focus on our core business,…build trust with our
clients, provide advice on discounts, and suggest the best
[insurance] product.”  When enacted in brokers’ practices,
Olympia-online recreated brokers’ relations with clients
through faster and more effective tailoring of insurance
products as well as with Olympia through more efficient
transacting of the business.  The wide adoption of these new
practices by the brokers created the market success22 of Phase
1 of Olympia-online and resulted in a significant increase in
revenue for Olympia.
  
Reconfiguration of the Olympia-online Phase 1 network con-
tinued during the implementation period, from mid-2002 to
mid-2003, leading to its gradual decomposition (see Figure
3b).  The GI top managers’ commitment and increased sup-
port for the Olympia-online project was expressed by their
readiness to invest in acquiring more expertise from
HighTech.  Through discussions and interviews with the GI
top managers, we discovered a hidden actor, “Emperor”:23
from their experience, it was “Emperor” that made Olympia-
online successful.  It is important to note that this enactment
of “Emperor” was different from the one in the Olympia-
online network, but equally real for the managers; it was
materially present when the HighTech team demonstrated the
prototype model of an insurance product based on “Emperor”
before the contract was signed.24  This enactment of
“Emperor” as a powerful and crucial actor was further con-
firmed by Olympia-online’s market success and was main-
tained through the relations among the GI top managers, the
HighTech team and the “Emperor,” but was not visible
outside these relations.25  “Emperor” was further strengthened
by the purchase of a $1 million licence for unlimited future
developments (event no. 9 in Figure 2).  The rationale for the
purchase was “Emperor’s” key role in Olympia-online’s
market success, making its trace visible.  The two actors—
Emperor and “Emperor”—were enacted in different relations;
they were different relational effects.  These were not dif-
ferent perceptions or representations of a single technology
but multiple forms of reality performed in these relations (Mol
2002).  Both actors continued to play important roles after the
decomposition of the Olympia-online Phase 1 project actor-
network.
As they initiated Phase 2, the GI top managers created a
Steering Committee, a powerful new actor, charged with strict
budgetary and deadline control (event no. 11 in Figure 2).
This event, together with the disintegration of the Olympia-
online Phase 1 project network, already underway during the
period of mid-2002 to mid-2003 (as shown on Figure 3b), led
to the emergence of two actor-networks in Phase 2:  the
Steering Committee actor-network and the Olympia-online
Phase 2 project actor-network (Figure 3c).  During Phase 2
development and implementation, the latter network stabilized
around Olympia-online development including intra-actions
with Horizon, the brokers, and business experts.  The Steering
Committee network included two new actors—the IS project
manager (Sebastian) and the business project manager
(Stuart), who had no prior knowledge of the project—
responsible for monitoring and controlling the Olympia-online
project.  They imposed strict control and a reporting regime
on the project.  The GI top managers became more detached
from the project network building instead tight relations
within the Steering Committee network.  The Steering Com-
mittee monitored the Phase 2 project via regular reports
22The analysis of the emerging actor-networks of brokers and clients that led
to the success would have been interesting but we could not get permission
to talk to brokers beyond the two involved in testing.
23To differentiate this “Emperor” from the Emperor in the Olympia-online
network discussed above, we use quotation marks.
24At the very beginning the GI top managers and IS managers were
impressed with the highly efficient development of a prototype for a single
insurance product based on “Emperor.”  They saw a small HighTech team
doing it quickly, but did not know that a team of 20 designers worked in the
background (hidden) to make this happen.
25As “Emperor” was not visible outside of the relations that produced it,
learning about it was only possible via the traces it left.
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presumed to accurately represent Olympia-online’s progress,
focusing on the selected aspects (costs and delivery) as
specified by assessment criteria, a new actor in this network.
The Steering Committee did not have to deal with the com-
plex reality of the Phase 2 development but only with parti-
cular representations that replaced and simplified reality.
The decomposition of the Olympia-online Phase 1 project
actor-network and the creation and emergence of the two
networks in Phase 2 had considerable implications for the
project, as we will now describe.  At the start of Phase 2, the
use of Emperor was debated again by the Olympia team.
However, abandoning it was politically unfeasible:
While we did look at chucking [Emperor] it was
politically not feasible…to go back to the [GI] busi-
ness managers and say, “Guess what, guys?  We’re
going to chuck it.  A million dollars worth of soft-
ware, because we don’t think it’s the right product”
(George, the head architect).
Furthermore, George added, the more code and application
software they developed based on Emperor, the less likely
they were to abandon it.  Emperor thus remained the rule-
based engine in Phase 2 (event no. 12).
The application software in Phase 2 became even more
complex due to new functionality requirements for brokers
but also due to continued struggles with design solutions
based on Emperor and the mainframe.  The Olympia team
requested more resources from the Steering Committee,
arguing that the complexity of the system and the difficulties
with Emperor necessitated more resources than initially
planned (event no. 13).  Within the Steering Committee
network, this request was considered unjustified and was,
therefore, rejected (event no. 14).  The developers and the
business experts then decided to focus on the requirements for
the brokers, delaying again the development of internal
functionality required by the GI managers (event no. 15).
This was not known beyond the Olympia-online Phase 2
project actor-network and was first reported to the Steering
Committee in May 2005.  The project was not going to have
internal functionality and was already over time and over
budget.  When they received the report, the Steering Com-
mittee soon decided to terminate Phase 2 development and
start the implementation (mid-2005).
After Olympia-online Phase 2 went live (event no. 16),
numerous brokers implemented it and thus effectively
enrolled in the Phase 2 network (see Figure 3c).  Having
previous experiences with Phase 1, the brokers appropriated
the Phase 2 system at a fast rate, expressing their appreciation
for further improvements and increased efficiency in their
work practices.  Again, the enactment of Olympia-online
Phase 2 in the brokers’ work practices recreated brokers’
relations with their clients and transacting with Olympia.
These new emerging sociomaterial practices produced an
agential cut:  the Olympia-online system that delighted
brokers and created market success; the Olympia-online
project was thus considered a success despite the lack of
internal functionality.
The sociomaterial practices in the Steering Committee actor-
network enacted a different Olympia-online project and
produced a competing assessment.  The intra-action among its
actors created the assessment criteria as a prominent actor that
played an important role in characterizing both the Olympia-
online Phase 2 project and the Olympia-online system, and in
producing objective assessments (Figure 3c).  The intra-action
in this network performed an agential cut that made Olympia-
online Phase 2 project an over-time and over-budget project
and Olympia-online a system that failed to provide required
and ordinary internal functionality; thus both were assessed as
evident failures (events nos. 17 and 18).  While the Olympia-
online market success, which had been created in the
Olympia-online Phase 2 network, was acknowledged, it was
not part of the agential cut that was enacted in the Steering
Committee network and produced the reality of the project
and the system failure.  The reality of failure had a detri-
mental consequence for the project:  Phase 3 development
was rejected.
Ontological Politics and the Rise of the
Agencies of Assessment
The above analysis reveals the dynamic reconfigurations and
decomposition of the Olympia-online actor-network and the
production and stabilization of competing assessments of both
the system and the project.  The analysis provides empirical
grounding for our examination of the key research question:
How do different and potentially competing assessments of an
information system and an IS project arise from different
sociomaterial practices?   We will explore potential answers
by looking more closely into the workings of ontological
politics in a particular trajectory of the Olympia-online net-
work reconfigurations that led to the enactment of different
sociomaterial practices.  This discussion will allow us to re-
veal how the agencies of assessment arose and gradually built
up in different and concurrent practices, thus producing com-
peting assessments together with the objects of assessment.
The tracing of reconfigurations of the Olympia-online project
actor-network, presented during different time periods in
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The location of each event from Figure 2 (events 1–18) depends on its contribution to the mobilization of actors and the
strengthening or weakening of relations in the Olympia-online project network (vertical dimension) and to the production of
success or failure (horizontal dimension).  While the events in Figure 2 are temporally ordered, they are presented here as
sequences of related events.  When one event precedes another (depicted by an arrow), it either causes or triggers or
leads to the other.  When a precedence link is vertical and going upwards, it indicates increasing mobilization of actors and
strengthening of relations in the Olympia-online project network (and vice versa).  When the link is horizontal and going to
the right, it contributes to the production of  success (and vice versa).  The dotted links suggest unintended and unantici-
pated influences.
Figure 4.  The Trajectory of the Olympia-online Project Actor-Network (event numbers correspond to
those in the project time line in Figure 2)
Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c, can be seen as a trajectory that we now
depict in a more compact form in a two-dimensional space
(Figure 4).  The trajectory of the Olympia-online project in
Figure 4 succinctly describes the sequences of events that
reconfigured the project actor-network and at some point
triggered its decomposition:  after event no. 9, two sequences
of events (nos. 9-12-13-15-16 and nos. 9-11-14-17-18)
followed, leading to the production of success and failure
respectively.  An interesting observation from the analysis of
the trajectory and particular paths taken at certain points in
time is that there is nothing inevitable in this trajectory.  At
any point in time, actions or decisions could have been dif-
ferent and the trajectory could have turned in another direc-
tion, opening different alternatives.  There is, we might say,
an inherent indeterminacy in the project network reconfigura-
tions arising from different intra-actions.  For example, after
the Olympia team encountered problems with Emperor (event
no. 4), a different course of actions could have been taken,
such as to abandon Emperor, discontinue the contract with
HighTech, and seek another rule-based engine; when the
Steering Committee was created (event no.  11), it could have
been mobilized into the Olympia-online Phase 2 project actor-
network; when Phase 2 development faced looming deadlines
and a lack of resources, different actions could have been
taken instead of postponing the development of internal
functionality (event no. 15).  At any point in time, the trajec-
tory of the Olympia-online project could have taken a dif-
ferent direction, leading to different outcomes; this also means
that some actions could have been reversible.26
26In some cases, though, reversibility may not be possible or can be costly.
For instance the more the application software was developed based on
Emperor, the more costly it became to abandon it and redevelop the software
on another rule-based software engine.  It would have been easier and less
costly to do it in Phase 1 (event no. 4) than in Phase 2 (event no. 12).
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If the trajectory of the project and the production of assess-
ments are not inherently determinate, the key question is, how
do they become so?  To explore this, we will discuss onto-
logical politics in some key paths of the Olympia-online
project’s trajectory.  Ontological politics implies that condi-
tions of possibility in the creation and emergence of actor-
networks and their sociomaterial practices are not given but
enacted and reenacted (Law 2004; Mol 2000).
A critical moment in the project trajectory seems to have been
the purchase of the Emperor licence (event no. 9) after which
the trajectory of the Olympia-online project split into two
parallel paths that produced different sociomaterial practices
and competing assessments (see Figures 3b, 3c, and Figure 4).
The ontological politics working behind the decomposition of
the Phase 1 network was evident in particular inclusions and
exclusions.  The build-up of relations among the GI top
management and the HighTech team strengthened the position
of “Emperor” leading to the purchase of the “Emperor”
licence and further deterioration of relations with the Olympia
team.  The Phase 1 IS project manager was made redundant
and the two new roles of an IS project manager and a business
project manager were created in Phase 2; assessment criteria
were also established (event no. 11).  These inclusions, that is,
particular ontological politics, reflected on the composition of
the Steering Committee network (see Figure 3c).   At the
same time, this politics was exclusionary:  they excluded the
development team, the business experts, the Olympia-online
network, other managers, and the brokers.  Such ontological
politics made a difference:  it instigated a particular path (nos.
9-11-14-17-18) rather than some alternative paths in the
project development trajectory; it also constituted the Steering
Committee as the authority acting on the company’s behalf.
The workings of ontological politics that produced the parallel
path (nos.  9-12-13-15-16) involved different inclusions and
exclusions in the Phase 2 project network.  To continue the
use of Emperor or to purchase another rule-based engine
could be seen as a key political decision at the time.  As we
have seen, after the $1 million investment in the Emperor
licence, it became politically unfeasible for the Olympia team
to abandon it.  Furthermore, the amount of software built on
Emperor during Phase 1 made it more difficult to “go back to
a point where alternative possibilities exist[ed]” (Walsham
and Sahay 1999, p. 42).  While the continued use of Emperor
was not inevitable, an alternative path was politically risky
and too costly.  Phase 2 development thus remained based on
Emperor (event no. 12).  As the difficulties with Emperor
continued (event no. 13) and additional resources were not
approved (event no. 14), the ontological politics in the Phase
2 network prioritized the development of Olympia-online
functionality for the brokers, thus practically excluding the
development of the required internal functionality (event no.
15).  Furthermore, the inclusion of brokers in the intense
intra-actions with the Olympia-online actor and the business
experts, as we have seen, enacted the sociomaterial practice
that produced the high quality Phase 2 system for the brokers
(event no. 16).
By the end of 2006, the two paths, as shown in Figure 4, had
produced different and competing assessments of the
Olympia-online project and the system.  To explain the pro-
duction of the competing assessments, we propose a new
concept:  an agency of assessment as a specific kind of agency
that arises through intra-actions and shows up in the resulting
sociomaterial practice that enacts a particular assessment
together with the object of assessment, as an agential cut.  In
the Steering Committee network, the emergence of a parti-
cular agency of assessment can be traced back to the
ontological politics that excluded the Phase 2 project actor-
network and instead included the project reports from this
network as true representations of the project.  The onto-
logical politics in this network also included the assessment
criteria, an actor that produced a particular view of what a
successful project and a successful system were, that is, a
“project completed on time and within budget” and a “system
delivered according to specifications” (as specified in the
Steering Committee meeting minutes).  Such views, as
Smithson and Tsiavos (2004, pp. 214-215) remind us, are
specific representations that translate and reduce the IS
project and the system assessment into simple, fact-like, and
objective measures.  The intra-acting within the Steering
Committee actor-network thus created a particular socio-
material practice in which these representations constituted
the Olympia-online project as one that was over time and over
budget, and Olympia-online as a system that failed to deliver
ordinary internal functionality.  As this network temporally
stabilized, the agency of assessment ultimately enacted both
the particular objects of assessment, that is, the project and the
system, as well as their assessments, as an agential cut.  In
other words, the agency of assessment that arose in this
network (by the end of 2006) and became ingrained in its
sociomaterial practice enacted a determinate reality of the
project and the system failure, as an agential cut.
The rise of a competing agency of assessment in the Phase 2
development network could be observed during the increasing
engagement of business experts and the brokers with the
Olympia-online development.  The ontological politics in this
network, the inclusion of brokers and allocation of con-
siderable resources to cater for their needs, and, in particular,
the intra-actions among the Olympia team, the application
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software, business experts, and the brokers, produced socio-
material practices that ultimately enacted the reality of
Olympia-online success.  These sociomaterial practices refer
to the Phase 2 project and to the Olympia-online system
embedded in brokers’ work processes of selling insurance
products to clients and transacting business with Olympia.
The intra-actions in the Phase 2 project (examined in-depth
earlier) ensured that the brokers engaged with and enacted
Olympia-online as a high quality system, which subsequently
attracted large numbers of brokers and became a market
success.  The agency of assessment in this network thus
performed an agential cut that made the Olympia-online
project and the system a determinate success.  In this case too,
the agency of assessment enacted both the objects of assess-
ment, the Olympia-online project and the system, and their
assessments.
The rise of different agencies of assessment and the enactment
of different, and mutually competing, realities of the Olympia-
online project and system success could, as we have seen in
the literature, be explained by different narratives, inter-
pretations, and social constructions by different stakeholders
or relevant social groups (Bartis and Mitev 2008; Fincham
2002; Wilson and Howcroft 2005).  In this case, we would
assume plurality of views and assessments of a single IS
project and system reality.  Plurality assumes the existence of
a single object that is observed, perceived, and interpreted
differently by different social groups (Law 2004; Mol 1999). 
But there was no such a thing as a single Olympia-online
project or a single Olympia-online system that existed, outside
of relations in actor-networks.  Instead, we found a multi-
plicity of both the Olympia-online project and the Olympia-
online system:  one enacted in the Steering Committee actor-
network and the other in the Olympia-online Phase 2 project
actor-network.  Multiplicity implies multiple realities that are
done and enacted rather than observed.  Rather than
being seen by a diversity of watching eyes while
itself remaining untouched in the centre, reality is
manipulated by means of various tools in the course
of a diversity of practices (Mol 1999, p. 77).
Expressed differently, the reasons for multiple IS realities and
competing assessments are not epistemological but rather
ontological.  As the Olympia-online actor-network decom-
posed into two different networks, different ontological
politics, inclusions and exclusions, and intra-actions in these
two actor-networks performed different sociomaterial prac-
tices and enabled different agencies of assessment to arise and
thus enact multiple IS realities and competing assessments.
The agencies of assessment enacted both the object and the
outcome of the assessments.
The analysis and discussion of the Olympia-online case
allowed us to theorize and illustrate the performative perspec-
tive on IS success.  The discussion shows that the success of
information systems is inherently indeterminate.  This does
not mean that researchers or practitioners are incapable of
assessing them.  This rather suggests that IS success is
indeterminate unless it becomes determinate by virtue of the
agency of assessment resulting from ontological politics and
intra-actions in an IS project actor-network.  As we have seen,
an agency of assessment enacted both the object of
assessment, what an information system is, and the outcome,
its success or failure, as an agential cut in an actor-network at
a particular point in time.  In this way, the inherent indeter-
minacy of IS success is locally and temporally resolved:  IS
success becomes determinable and determinate.  This also
implies that an information system  or IS project enacted in
different sociomaterial practices may in principle produce
multiple and competing realities of success and failure.  
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a theoretical and empirical argument
for a performative perspective on IS success, and thereby
contribute to the emerging sociomaterial literature (Orlikow-
ski and Scott 2008; Suchman 2007).  Based on a relational
ontology—that everything exists in relations—the performa-
tive perspective endorses a particular view of IS success or
failure as sociomaterial accomplishments performed in and by
heterogeneous and continually reconfiguring IS project actor-
networks.  Like any perspective, it is both limited to and
productive of the specific nature of the phenomenon studied. 
It is thus important to recognize that the performative perspec-
tive makes IS success and failure intelligible in a particular
way.  To appreciate its value and contribution, it is also
important to highlight what kind of novel insights into IS
assessments are enabled by the performative perspective and
whether or how they matter.  In this concluding section, we
summarize particular insights provided by the performative
perspective and its contributions to understanding IS success
and how multiple and competing assessments come about. 
While doing this, we also reflect on its limitations and suggest
some promising avenues for further research.
First, by conceiving of IS projects as actor-networks that
enroll and mobilize heterogeneous actors—managers, tech-
nologies, IS developers, methodologies, business cases, users,
committees, project documents, reports, and others—to
develop and implement information systems, the performative
perspective adopts a particular sociomaterial worldview that
reveals some and not other events, processes, or mechanisms
relevant for IS projects and their success.  For instance, it
582 MIS Quarterly Vol. 38 No. 2/June 2014
Cecez-Kecmanovic et al./Reframing Success & Failure of Information Systems
focuses on IS project actor-networks within which actors
define and negotiate a space, a scope, a period of time, and
resources (Law and Callon 1997) as well as “a common
political agenda and field of action” (McMaster and Wastell
2005, p. 180) for the development and implementation of an
information system.  It is the IS project actor-networks and
their shifting sociomaterial practices, within which informa-
tion systems are enacted and reenacted, and in which these
enactments produce multiple and potentially competing
realities of IS success or failure.  By seeing IS assessments as
relational effects produced together with the objects of
assessments—information systems and IS projects—the
performative perspective is thus fundamentally nonrepre-
sentational.   As such, it proposes that IS project actor-
networks, their configurations and reconfigurations, are of
central importance for investigating, questioning, and under-
standing IS success and failure in practice.
Second, and following from the above, the performative
perspective reveals that success or failure of information
systems and IS projects are inherently indeterminate, as our
empirical study illustrates.  This is due to the dynamic and
emergent nature of IS project actor-networks with the possi-
bility of alternative reconfigurations and performance of
different realities always present (Law 2004; Mol 1999).  As
ontological politics reconfigures an IS actor-network, per-
forming particular inclusions and exclusions, and thereby
enabling specific intra-actions, the production of IS success
may become temporally determinable and determinate.  This
happens when an agency of assessment emerges through
specific intra-actions in an IS project actor-network,
producing sociomaterial practices that enact, as an agential
cut, both an information system as the object of assessment
and its assessment.  In other words, the IS project and the
implemented system as objects of assessment are not given
and fixed but are performed by the agencies of assessments,
together with their assessment.  It is also important to note
that an agency of assessment is inextricably tied to the
dynamics of sociomaterial arrangements in an IS project
actor-network rather than inherent in specific network
elements.  The theoretical propositions—that IS success or
failure are inherently indeterminate and that they become
temporally determinate by agential cuts preformed by parti-
cular agencies of assessment emerging in IS project actor-
networks—challenge the conventional wisdom of representa-
tional views of IS assessment.  Further case studies are called
for to scrutinize these propositions and investigate their
relevance in different contexts and situations.
Third, through the analysis of the reconfigurations of the
Olympia-online project actor-networks, the paper explains
and illustrates how multiple realities of an IS success and
failure can be produced concurrently.  When an IS project
actor-network decomposes into two or more actor-networks
and these networks become more disconnected, chances are
the realities produced by these networks could be multiple
and not necessarily coherent.  While multiple and non-
coherent IS project realities may cohabitate and stimulate
development, conflicting and competing realities may be
disturbing and jeopardize further development, as was the
case with the Olympia-online project.  This insight draws
attention to important questions regarding the multiple and
conflicting IS realities that the performative perspective can
help explore and address. 
The performative perspective provides new conceptual
resources to research and understand multiple enactments of
information systems and potentially conflicting IS realities by
exposing ontological politics at work in their production.
While it may seem that ontological politics is our destiny,
numerous lessons from the Olympia case teach us that there
were options to make different choices along the way and to
reenact realities differently (Law 2004; Mol 1999).  Further-
more, paying attention to the ways agencies of assessment
emerge in different actor-networks—resulting from different
ontological politics and intra-acting—helps reveal how
multiple IS realities are performed in different networks.   It
also reveals often hidden capacities for action to perform
realities differently.  The implications are significant:  the
multiplicity of IS realities in different IS project actor-
networks becomes transparent and open for scrutiny and
intervention.  As a result, the performative perspective offers
new avenues for researching, understanding, and living with
a multiplicity of IS realities and assessments and also, and
importantly, opens new research questions about conflicting
realities that threaten IS projects and how to deal with them.
Fourth, the performative framing of IS success allows us to
broaden the view and make intelligible the different framings
from the literature.  By effacing the complex and contingent
production of success or failure within emergent and
reconfiguring actor-networks and by focusing only on the
outcomes—the final verdict of success or failure of an
information system and an IS project—they appear as discrete
and determinate states that are objectively measured (repre-
sented) as assumed by the objective/rational framing (DeLone
and McLean 2003; Dibbern et al. 2004; Flowers 1996; Urbach
et al. 2008; Wang 2008).  On the other hand, by focusing on
the sensemaking, interpretive, and political processes of
information systems and IS project assessments, one could
reveal narratives and interpretations, that is, subjective repre-
sentations, of success and failure by different stakeholders or
relevant social groups as suggested by the subjective/political
framing (Bartis and Mitev 2008; Fincham 2002; Klecun and
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Cornford 2005; Mitev 2000; Sauer 1993).  It is important to
note that the performative framing of IS success is not
proposed instead of the other two; rather, it extends existing
knowledge by providing a conceptual apparatus that broadens
the vision and enables understanding of specific conditions
that make intelligible the different framings of IS success. 
For instance, it allows us to make visible the selected aspects
of assessment, outcome, and process that these framings focus
on and those they exclude.  It also enables us to examine the
creation of what is assumed to comprise relevant social
groups, their particular inclusions and exclusions, and explain
how they come to construct particular narratives and inter-
pretations of IS success.
Fifth, the performative framing of IS success has some
important practical implications.   How an IS project is en-
acted in practice and how IS success or failure are performed
are not just interesting research questions.  They are highly
pertinent practical questions.  By making the familiar pro-
cesses of IS assessment unfamiliar, that is, seeing them as
inherently indeterminate, the performative perspective on IS
success sensitizes managers, both IS and others, to focus their
attention on the reconfiguration of relations in IS projects and
the workings of ontological politics and how they bring about
a particular agency of assessment that temporally enacts an
agential cut:  determinate IS assessments together with the IS
as the object of assessment.  However, to make the performa-
tive perspective applicable in practice, its concepts and the
language of project actor-networks, ontological politics, intra-
actions, agency of assessment and agential cuts, need to be
translated into the mundane vocabulary of IS practitioners.
While these concepts are derived from real-life contexts, the
language of performative perspective presents a barrier to
their use in practice.  The translation, though, is not a straight-
forward and linear process.  A cooperative effort by practi-
tioners and researchers is required to instantiate and prac-
tically enact the conceptual apparatus of the performative
perspective in existing IS projects, and then observe what they
do and how they make actors see and act differently.
Finally, we suggest that the performative perspective might
help us change conversations on IS success from being
focused on questions of epistemology (how we find out
whether an information system is a success or failure) to
questions of ontology (how an information system and its
success or failure come into being).  Changing the conversa-
tions may have important implications for changing practices
of IS assessments and the ways IS failure rates are reported.
This is timely and may help us explain why companies world-
wide are not deterred by the reported high IS failure rates
while increasing IS investments and their expectations for
information systems to support innovation and growth
(McKinsey & Company 2011).
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Appendix






Role in the Olympia-online Development and Implementation
Project
Information Services
CIO Jiashu Interview Senior executive in the Information Services Department who
served on the Phase 2 Steering Committee
Head of IS for GI Henry Informal
discussion
Olympia manager reporting to CIO responsible for IS development








Olympia architect for Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the project;  provided
critical data about the history of the project and documents relevant
for understanding the Phase 1 development project; provided also
insights into current developments and emerging situations 
HightTech Architect Sunil Interview and
informal
discussions






Formerly an employee of the consulting company HighTech
contracted to develop the Phase 1 system; becomes a permanent
employee of Olympia in Phase 2 of the project and continues as a
member of the Phase 2 system support team in production 
Application
Developer
Patrick Interview Application developer hired by Olympia as a permanent to work on






Hired by Olympia as a permanent employee to work on the Phase






Permanent employee of Olympia responsible for parts of





Olympia employee responsible for Phase 2 development and
migration from Phase 1 to Phase 2 system
IS Project Manager Sebastian Informal
discussion
Hired by Olympia as a permanent employee to work on the Phase
2 project responsible to deliver the Olympia-Online system on time
and on budget; member of the Steering Committee
Data Migration
Developer
Robert Interview Hired by Olympia as a permanent employee to work on Phase 2 of
the project, responsible for migrating existing customer data from
the Phase 1 system to the new Phase 2 system; continues as a
member of the Phase 2 support team in production
Test Team Leader Gareth Interview Hired as a contractor to work on the Phase 2 project; continued as







External contractors involved in testing in Phase 1 and 2
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Table A1.  Human Actors Involved in Interviewees and Informal Discussions During Phase 2





Role in the Olympia-online Development and Implementation
Project
General Insurance
Head of GI Roger Informal
discussion







Olympia business expert liaising with a broker community in Phase
1 and Phase 2 of the project.
Business Expert –
Underwriting
Roland Interview The Olympia underwriting business expert from Phase 1 and
Phase 2 of the project
Senior GI business
manager 
Rene Interview One of the top GI managers responsible for and involved in
Olympia-online project in both phases









Stuart Interview Olympia business project manager for Phase 2 of the project and a










Early users of Olympia-online who worked closely with Business
Expert (liaising with brokers) during testing and improvements in
Phase 2
Table A2.  Olympia-online Documents
Phase 1 Documents Phase 2 Documents
Business plan Phase 2 development document
Contract with HighTech Renewed contract with HightTech
Business case and scope document New scope document
Business information requirements document Business information requirements document
Emperor licence document Emperor licence document
Change requests (14) Change requests (26)
Test plans (3) Test plans (5)
Test cases (23) Test cases (38)
Meeting minutes (27) Meeting minutes (35)
Project reports (3) Project reports (12)




Mainframe based e-commerce platform BrokerLine
Web-based e-business platform Horizon
Rule-based engine Emperor
Olympia-online application software
Interface designs and programs
588 MIS Quarterly Vol. 38 No. 2/June 2014
Copyright of MIS Quarterly is the property of MIS Quarterly & The Society for Information
Management and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a
listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print,
download, or email articles for individual use.
